Optional presentation practice. Choices and model launches do not write LMS grades, completion or certificates.
Choose the right assessment question, trace credible scenarios and challenge unsupported protection claims.
A hazard is a source of potential harm. Risk concerns the likelihood and consequences of a defined harmful event under stated conditions. Naming a substance or writing “high risk” does not explain the event or the control question.
The proposed branch review uses a general “slips and PPE” checklist but has not examined no flow, reverse flow, wrong destination, excess pressure or utility loss.
A HAZID can help identify hazards and major scenarios across a defined activity or lifecycle stage. What-if questions explore how a proposed deviation or failure could matter. Both depend on suitable information, competent participation and a clear boundary.
A fault tree asks what combinations could produce an unwanted event. An event tree asks what may follow an initiating event as protective functions succeed or fail.
Fictional exercise: A team wants to explore outcomes after a defined leak, depending on detection and response.
The question follows consequences after an initiating event.
A guideword and parameter help generate a deviation, such as no flow or reverse flow. The team then examines credible causes, consequences, existing safeguards and necessary actions. These entries should not be merged into one vague statement.
A simple score can miss credible process deviations and dependencies, leaving protection unrelated to the actual accident scenarios.
Hold design or operating release until a suitable multidisciplinary process-risk review and necessary actions are completed.
An event tree starts from an initiating event and follows possible outcomes through success or failure of relevant functions. A fault tree starts with a defined unwanted event and examines combinations that could produce it. Their direction helps answer different questions.
A barrier can become ineffective through a degraded condition or changed dependency. Identify what can defeat its function and what maintains or verifies it. Ownership should connect performance requirements, inspections or tests and the response to an unavailable condition.
Return to the same fictional model case. Select the evidence needed before relying on the control.
Trace identified causes and consequences to implemented, owned safeguards and closed actions; check assumptions, independence and residual risk using competent review.
A temporary reactor bypass ruptured and a vapour-cloud explosion followed. The investigation identified inadequate assessment and verification of the plant modification.
Apply the learning from Flixborough, 1 June 1974 to the current task.
Examine deviations, credible consequence paths and supported safeguard claims.
Use the full course for detailed teaching, required activities and the separate final assessment. Presentation choices are practice and do not write LMS grades or completion.
The PowerPoint contains the presentation and notes. Enable JavaScript for the online choices and classification activity.